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THE INTEGRITY RIGHT OF AN MP3:  
HOW THE INTRODUCTION OF MORAL RIGHTS INTO U.S. 
LAW CAN HELP COMBAT ILLEGAL PEER-TO-PEER MUSIC 
FILE SHARING 
Cassandra Spangler ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, a nineteen-year-old Northeastern University undergra-
duate named Shawn Fanning created a computer service called Nap-
ster that allowed users to access a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) network, 
enabling music file sharing that would forever change the environ-
ment of the music industry.1  Upon launch, the number of Napster 
users doubled every two days.2  At its peak, Napster had an estimated 
forty million users.3  At the same time, entertainment industry sales 
dropped rapidly; by 2003, the recorded music and film industries 
were losing $7.6 billion annually due to piracy.4  File sharing has since 
engendered a widely publicized controversy in the United States, fea-
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 1 JOSEPH MENN, ALL THE RAVE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SHAWN FANNING’S NAPSTER 
36 (2003). 
 2 Id. at 6. 
 3 Id. at 101. 
 4 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 63 (2004) (“The recording 
industry estimates that it loses about $4.6 billion every year to physical piracy . . . .  
The [Motion Picture Association of America] estimates that it loses $3 billion annual-
ly to worldwide piracy.”). 
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turing the “content holders” (record labels) and the “downloaders”5 
(who are looking more and more like the American public6) as the 
key players in this controversy.  More than seven years of legal battles 
have not come close to eradicating file sharing, with music sales down 
thirty-six percent since 2000,7 leading many to conclude that the 
record industry must adapt or else go the way of disco.8  While various 
possible appropriate adaptations exist, this Comment discusses only 
one—the implementation of moral-rights protection for musical art-
ists in the United States. 
There are two types of interests at stake in a work of art: econom-
ic interests and personality interests.9  Copyrights, which are strongly 
recognized in the United States, protect economic interests, whereas 
moral rights protect the artists’ personality interests.10  These interests 
can often conflict.  The United States chooses to favor copyrights 
(i.e., economic rights) over moral rights.  This focus on economic 
rights implies that only the economic interest is worthy of legal pro-
tection, leading music to be viewed merely as a commodity.  This 
Comment argues that U.S. law ought to recognize moral rights for 
musicians in order to shift the view of music as a commodity to music 
as an art form with value beyond economics and to illustrate that mu-
sicians have a personal stake in their music.  Finally, this Comment 
argues that such a shift in the view of music and musicians would dis-
courage illegal music-file sharing over the long term and thus help 
the record industry survive the transition into the Digital Age. 
 
 5 It should be noted that, technically, these suits are usually against music up-
loaders (as opposed to downloaders); however, the term “downloader” will be used 
in this Comment to refer generally to those that utilize P2P programs to share music 
(both uploading and downloading) without permission from the copyright holder. 
 6 See WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 126 (2004) (noting that Recording Industry Association 
of America (RIAA) lawsuits have targeted a diverse group of defendants, from a 
twelve-year-old girl to a Yale professor). 
 7 Evan Serpick, EMI Changes the Game, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 6, 2008, at 19, 19; see 
DAVID KUSEK & GERD LEONHARD, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC: MANIFESTO FOR THE DIGITAL 
MUSIC REVOLUTION 101 (2005).  In 2005, more files were downloaded illegally each 
month than had typically been sold by the music industry each year, and the number 
of downloaders continued to increase by more than 100% each year.  Id. 
 8 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 2 (suggesting that if widespread use of P2P sys-
tems continues, “the market for authorized sound recordings is bound to deteri-
orate”). 
 9 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectnal [sic] Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 
330, 339 (1988) (characterizing moral rights as protecting personality interests). 
 10 See id.; Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of In-
tegrity Rights, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 297, 304 (2003). 
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Part II of this Comment provides a historical background of 
moral rights.  This background includes a definition of moral rights, 
a contrast of moral rights with copyrights, a discussion of the coun-
tries that recognize moral rights, and an examination of the minimal 
extent to which the United States protects moral rights.  Part III ar-
gues that U.S. law recognizes moral rights to such a minimal extent 
because the nation views art primarily as a commodity and that this 
view of art as a commodity contributes to illegal music-file sharing.  
This Comment then posits that the introduction of moral rights into 
U.S. copyright law would help discourage illegal file sharing.  Part IV 
discusses reasons why record labels may initially be opposed to moral-
rights legislation and then argues that moral rights are nonetheless 
necessary to help these record labels compete with ever-advancing 
technologies, with which copyright lawsuits are unable to keep pace. 
II. CONTRASTING EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN LEGAL  
PROTECTION OF ARTISTIC WORKS 
“Moral rights” and “copyrights” are both legal terms for groups 
of rights vested in artistic works.  However, the two differ greatly in 
both the rights they afford and the theories used to justify those 
rights.  These differences are reflected in a comparison of nations 
that legally recognize moral rights with nations that do not—with na-
tions valuing art as a cultural contribution tending to recognize mor-
al rights and nations viewing art as a commodity tending to disfavor 
moral rights because of their potential to limit the value of copy-
rights. 
A. Moral Rights as a “Bundle of Rights”: Protecting the Relationship 
Between Artist and Artwork 
Moral rights theory begins with the premise that an artist gives a 
piece of herself through her work,11 resulting in a unique relationship 
between the artist and the artwork.12  In other words, the art is an ex-
tension of the artist.13  Because of this special relationship, harm to 
the art is thought to result in personal harm to the artist.14  Moral 
rights seek to prevent this sort of harm by allowing the artist to retain 
 
 11 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995); Kathryn A. Kelly, 
Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free Speech, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. 
& SPORTS L. REV. 211, 211 (1994). 
 12 Susan P. Liemer, Understanding Artists’ Moral Rights: A Primer, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 41, 43 (1998). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
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control over the creative process and the final product.15  In this 
sense, moral rights protect the artist’s “personality interest.”16 
Like copyrights, moral rights are a “bundle of rights,”17 with the 
rights of attribution and integrity comprising the core of this bun-
dle.18  The right of attribution19 is the right to claim authorship of a 
work and to “determine where and how the author’s name shall be 
affixed to the work.”20  This right also includes the right not to claim 
authorship—that is, to remain anonymous or to use a pseudonym.21  
This “helps ensure the artist’s name is attributed to all her work and 
her work only.”22  Professor Susan Liemer describes this as “maintain-
ing an accurate chain of title to the creative process.”23 
The second core moral right is the right of integrity, which is the 
right of the author to “prevent any deforming or mutilating changes 
to his work.”24  This right prevents the alteration or public presenta-
tion of the work in a context that would “injure [the artist’s] honor 
or reputation.”25  Whether or not this right prevents the complete de-
struction of a work is a current source of controversy.26 
Several other rights are sometimes included in the bundle of 
moral rights.  The right of disclosure is the right to decide when “a 
work should be released to the public.”27  The right of withdrawal is 
the corresponding right to decide whether the work should be re-
tracted after being released “because it no longer reflects the author’s 
personal convictions.”28  Resale royalty rights entitle the artist to a 
 
 15 Id. at 44. 
 16 See Hughes, supra note 9, at 339; Ong, supra note 10, at 304. 
 17 Kelly, supra note 11, at 212. 
 18 Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 19 The right of attribution is also known as the right to paternity.  E.g., Liemer, 
supra note 12, at 47. 
 20 Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 363 
(2006). 
 21 Carter, 71 F.3d at 81; Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 364. 
 22 Liemer, supra note 12, at 49. 
 23 Id. at 51. 
 24 Carter, 71 F.3d at 81. 
 25 Brian T. McCartney, “Creepings” and “Glimmers” of the Moral Rights of Artists in 
American Copyright Law, 6 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 35, 38 (1998) (quoting Thomas F. Cot-
ter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997)). 
 26 Compare Carter, 71 F.3d at 81 (“In some jurisdictions the integrity right also pro-
tects artwork from destruction.”), with Liemer, supra note 12, at 51 (“Traditionally, 
the right of integrity does not protect the art work from total destruction by anoth-
er.”). 
 27 Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 362. 
 28 Id. 
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portion of the profits when others financially benefit from her work.29  
An additional moral right is the prohibition against excessive criti-
cism, which protects the author against abusive and malicious criti-
cism of her work.30  Finally, moral rights may contain a broad prohibi-
tion against any other attacks on the personality of the creator.31 
B. Moral Rights as Distinguished from Copyrights 
Moral rights and copyrights both protect artistic works, but each 
protects different interests in those works.  While copyrights protect 
economic interests—the potential profit that derives from the work—
moral rights protect the artist’s personality interest.32  In this sense, 
copyrights are essentially economic rights that are often understood 
as property rights.33  In contrast, “moral rights are personal rights; 
they are not based on any theory of property, for whatever ‘property’ 
the creator may possess exists in the rights protected by the copyright 
statute.”34 
Moral rights exist independently of any property interest in the 
work,35 hence moral rights exist independently of copyrights.36  Copy-
rights are insufficient to protect the artist’s personality interest be-
cause, while copyrights protect the economic exploitation of artistic 
works, “when an artist creates . . .  he does more than bring into the 
world a unique object having only exploitative possibilities . . . .”37  In 
addition to profit-making capability, artwork has the ability to affect 
human emotion, cultivate new ideas, and serve as social commentary, 
among other things.  Such supra-economic reasons necessitate the 
protection of artistic works; however, these additional reasons are not 
protected by copyright statutes.  As a result, moral rights theory de-
veloped beyond copyright protection to protect the non-economic 
value of an artistic work. 
Moral rights are not only independent of copyrights but also dif-
fer from copyrights in several key respects.  First, each type of right 
affords a different duration of protection.  Moral rights are perpe-
 
 29 Liemer, supra note 12, at 55. 
 30 Martin A. Roeder, Note, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, 
Authors, and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 572 (1940). 
 31 Id. at 573. 
 32 See Hughes, supra note 9, at 351; Ong, supra note 10, at 304. 
 33 E.g., LESSIG, supra note 4, at 83. 
 34 Roeder, supra note 30, at 564. 
 35 Liemer, supra note 12, at 44. 
 36 See Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 37 Roeder, supra note 30, at 557. 
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tual,38 whereas copyrights are limited by statute.39  Additionally, moral 
rights are, theoretically,40 unwaivable.41  Copyrights can freely be 
bought and sold,42 whereas moral rights are not transferable.43  Copy-
rights are attached to the work, whereas moral rights are attached to 
the artist.  This means that moral rights “remain vested in the artist 
even after the work has been transferred.”44  While the moral right is 
always granted to the creator, the copyright is almost always granted 
to the owner of the work.45  In the American copyright system, the 
creator is the original owner (unless the work is a work for hire or as-
signment); however, the creator almost always assigns the copyright 
in a musical work to the record label.46  It is therefore not unique for 
the author and the owner of a work, especially a musical work, to in 
fact be different people.47  A final difference between copyrights and 
moral rights lies in remedies.  Whereas remedies for copyright in-
fringement usually take the form of money damages,48 moral-rights 
violations usually entail equitable relief because “the injury suffered 
by the creator will not be measurable in dollars and cents, although it 
may well be irreparable.”49 
 
 38 See RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS, 
INVESTORS, DEALERS AND ARTISTS 1256 (3d ed. 2005) (imparting that moral rights are 
inviolable). 
 39 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (establishing that, as of 2007, 
copyright term is author’s life plus seventy years if the owner is a natural person or 
the shorter of 120 years after creation or ninety years after publication if the owner is 
a corporation). 
 40 Some nations’ moral-rights statutes allow moral rights to be waived.  See LERNER 
& BRESLER, supra note 38, at 1256–57. 
 41 Id. at 1256. 
 42 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1)–(2) (establishing that copyrights can be transferred 
in part or in whole). 
 43 See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 93 Civ. 
0373 (KTD), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1643, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2000) (noting that 
moral rights are not assignable); Liemer, supra note 12, at 44 (stating that the artist 
cannot sell, give away, or bequeath moral rights). 
 44 LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 38, at 1255–56. 
 45 See Roeder, supra note 30, at 576 (“Copyright in America, as limited by statute, 
was designed to protect only the exploitative value of creation; its protection is not 
granted to the creator as such, but to the owner, the person having the power to ex-
ploit the creation.”). 
 46 See, e.g., Rajan Desai, Music Licensing, Performance Rights Societies, and Moral 
Rights for Music: A Need in the Current U.S. Music Licensing Scheme and a Way to Provide 
Moral Rights, 10 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2001). 
 47 See Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 360. 
 48 See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 49 Roeder, supra note 30, at 574. 
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C. Moral Rights Are Generally a Continental European Phenomenon 
Historically, continental Europe has recognized moral rights, 
whereas Anglo-American countries have failed to do so.50  One author 
succinctly characterizes this split as “droit d’auteur51 countries,” which 
view intellectual property as tied to the author in a personal manner, 
as opposed to “copyright countries,” which view intellectual property 
as simply another form of property.52  As of 2003, eighty-one countries 
of the world, including Mexico, Canada, France, Germany, and Sin-
gapore,53 recognized moral rights to varying extents.54  The European 
Union also recognizes moral rights.55 
The French legal system provides the strongest existing protec-
tion for moral rights.56  It is thus no surprise that moral rights doc-
trine (known as “droit moral”57) was first developed in France during 
the nineteenth century.58  This early droit moral doctrine was a hybrid 
of decisions handed down in French courts and the modern view of 
moral rights developing simultaneously in Germany.59  The French 
moral-rights statute, codified in the Law of March 11, 1957,60 estab-
lishes the rights of attribution, integrity, and disclosure and states that 
these rights are “perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible.”61 
 
 50 This has historically been true, although the United Kingdom adopted limited 
moral-rights legislation in 1988.  See Copyrights, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 
(Eng.); Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 354. 
 51 Translated from French into English, meaning the “non-pecuniary, special 
(personal) right of an author, artist, etc. in his work.”  F.H.S. BRIDGE, THE COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE FRENCH-ENGLISH LEGAL DICTIONARY 208 (1994). 
 52 Michèle Battisti, The Future of Copyright Management: European Perspectives 
(Sept. 27, 2000), http://www.ifla.org/IV/ifla66/papers/140-184e.htm. 
 53 McCartney, supra note 25, at 71–72. 
 54 LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. KING, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 203 (2000). 
 55 McCartney, supra note 25, at 71–72. 
 56 See Liemer, supra note 12, at 41; Kimberly Y.W. Holst, Article, A Case of Bad Cre-
dit?: The United States and the Protection of Moral Rights in Intellectual Property Law, 3 
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 108 (2006). 
 57 “Droit moral” is treated as synonymous with “droit d’auteur,” meaning the “non-
pecuniary, special (personal) right of an author, artists, etc. in his work.”  BRIDGE, su-
pra note 51, at 208. 
 58 See Liemer, supra note 12, at 41–42. 
 59 Natalie C. Suhl, Note, Moral Rights Protection in the United States Under the Berne 
Convention: A Fictional Work?, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203, 
1206–10 (2002). 
 60 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 
311 (4th ed. 2002). 
 61 Id. 
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D. The Current State of Moral Rights in U.S. Law 
Anglo-American copyright protection originates in the Statute of 
Anne.62  In 1774, the British House of Lords held in Donaldson v. Beck-
ett that no copyright protection existed beyond that granted by the 
Statute of Anne.63  Since the Statute of Anne did not contain a moral-
rights provision, moral rights were held not to exist at common law.64 
This common-law focus on statutory interpretation bled into ear-
ly American copyright law.65  Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion establishes copyright protection in the United States.66  Since the 
Constitution, like the Statute of Anne, does not explicitly grant mor-
al-rights protection, moral rights have been held not to exist in U.S. 
copyright law.67  The stance that U.S. law affords no moral-rights pro-
tection was carried over into the twentieth century and made clear in 
Vargas v. Esquire, in which the court held that while foreign countries 
may recognize moral rights, the United States does not.68 
While art has been an important part of European culture for 
centuries,69 the United States is a relatively young country and thus 
has a shorter history generally and a lesser quantum of artistic history 
specifically.  Moreover, from its inception, the United States has been 
less focused on art than continental European countries.  Early U.S. 
culture focused more on industry, with the nation quickly becoming 
a leader in trade and manufacturing; therefore, “while the European 
culture was marked with the works of great authors and artists, the 
culture of the United States was filled with names like Ford, Carnegie, 
and Rockefeller, who were leaders in industry.”70  The United States 
has historically imported most of its art.71  In contrast, French art was 
world-renowned for centuries prior to the development of the droit 
 
 62 See generally An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies 
of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times 
Therein Described, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.); Susan P. Liemer, How We Lost Our 
Moral Rights and the Door Closed on Non-Economic Values in Copyright, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 12–14 (2005). 
 63 Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L.) (appeal taken from 
Scot.). 
 64 Id.; Liemer, supra note 62, at 28–32. 
 65 Liemer, supra note 62, at 32–36. 
 66 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 67 See Liemer, supra note 62, at 34–35. 
 68 Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947). 
 69 Holst, supra note 56, at 117–20. 
 70 Id. at 122. 
 71 Id. 
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moral.72  U.S. law developed appropriately with this historical focus on 
industry and lack of artistic tradition, providing more protection for 
property rights73 and less protection for the arts.74  One author de-
scribes this phenomenon as follows: “Busy with the economic exploi-
tation of her vast natural wealth, America has, perhaps, neglected the 
arts; in any event American legal doctrine has done so, and the pauci-
ty of material outside the copyright law on the rights of creators 
forms a vivid contrast to the continental jurisprudence.”75 
Although a leader in developing intellectual property, the Unit-
ed States waited more than one hundred years to join the Berne 
Convention, an international copyright agreement first ratified in 
1886 and boasting 163 national signatories as of 2007.76  This reluc-
tance may be due in large part to the American desire not to recog-
nize moral rights.77  When the United States finally did join the Berne 
Convention, the nation’s lack of moral-rights protection became a 
source of controversy because Article 6bis of the Convention requires 
signatories to recognize, at a minimum, the rights of attribution and 
integrity.78 
Congress enacted the Berne Implementation Act in 1988 and of-
ficially joined the Berne Convention in 1989.79  The Berne Implemen-
tation Act states that U.S. adherence to the Berne Convention does 
not “expand or reduce” authors’ rights to “claim authorship to the 
work” (right to attribution) or “object to any distortion, mutilation, 
 
 72 See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 
1023, 1042 (1976). 
 73 See FISHER, supra note 6, at 138 (arguing that legal rights known as “property 
rules” enjoy greater protection in the United States); id. at 140 (stating that “[r]eal 
property rights are highly favored by the law”). 
 74 See Hughes, supra note 9, at 288 (stating that “ideas about property have played 
a central role in shaping the American legal order”). 
 75 Roeder, supra note 30, at 557. 
 76 See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 
Stat. 2853 (1988). 
 77 McCartney, supra note 25, at 40–41. 
 78 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
6bis., Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (rev., Paris, July 24, 1971) [he-
reinafter Berne Convention]. 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the 
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim au-
thorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or oth-
er modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said 
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. 
Id. 
 79 See Berne Convention Implementation Act. 
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or other modification” (right to integrity) of the work.80  This Act can 
be fairly read to mean that the United States’ signing of the Berne 
Convention does not grant authors the rights of attribution and inte-
grity, despite the fact that membership to the Convention is condi-
tioned on a nation’s guarantee of those rights. 
Congress has taken some statutory steps to bring the United 
States closer to compliance with the Berne Convention’s moral-rights 
requirement.  Congress enacted the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (VARA) 
in 1990.81  VARA establishes the right to paternity and integrity and 
the right to prevent destruction of the work if it is of “recognized sta-
ture.”82  However, VARA applies only to visual artists,83 so it is not rele-
vant to this Comment on the protection of musical works.  In addi-
tion to VARA, several states have enacted limited moral-rights 
legislation.84  Like VARA, however, these state statutes apply only to 
 
 80 Id. § 3(b)(1)–(2). 
 81 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1990). 
 82 Id. § 106A(a)(1)–(3). 
[T]he author of a work of visual art— 
     (1) shall have the right— 
          (A) to claim authorship of that work, and 
          (B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any  
               work of visual art which he or she did not create; [and] 
      . . . . 
          (A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or modifi- 
               cation of that work . . . , and 
          (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature. 
Id. 
 83 Id. § 106A(b) (establishing that “only the author of a work of visual art has the 
rights conferred by subsection (a)”).  Hansmann and Santilli postulate that VARA 
and similar state statutes are limited to visual art because the economic value of visual 
art is more dependent than other art forms on the artist’s reputation.  Henry Hans-
mann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 108–09 (1997); see also Brian A. Lee, Making 
Sense of “Moral Rights”: Artists’ European-Style Intellectual Property Protections 
within the American System 46 (Mar. 7, 2008) (unpublished comment, on file with 
the Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=yale/ylsspps.  Lee 
provides another reason for the limitation of VARA and state statutes to visual art, 
postulating that visual art cannot be identically reproduced, whereas music, books, 
and motion pictures can be; this necessitates a right of integrity for visual art and not 
other art forms.  Lee, supra, at 47; see also infra notes 84–85 (describing state statutes 
similar to VARA). 
 84 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2009) (establishing that “physical altera-
tion or destruction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist’s personality, is de-
trimental to the artist’s reputation, and artists therefore have an interest in protect-
ing their works of fine art against any alteration or destruction”). 
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visual art and not to music.85  Furthermore, VARA may preempt these 
state statutes.86 
How can the United States be both a member of the Berne Con-
vention and seemingly violate its moral-rights requirement?  Congress 
sidesteps this issue by claiming that existing U.S. law adequately pro-
tects these interests through common-law causes of action, such as 
unfair competition, copyright, contract, defamation, and the right to 
privacy.87  However, these common-law causes of action are grossly in-
sufficient in protecting, and are in fact often at odds with, moral 
rights. 
One way the United States arguably protects artists’ moral rights 
is through trademark and unfair competition law under the Lanham 
Act.88  The Lanham Act provides a cause of action against anyone who 
creates a “false designation of origin.”89  Commentators argue that 
this is comparable to the moral right of attribution because it pre-
vents false claims to authorship of works.90  A general problem with 
this approach is that the Lanham Act is designed to protect economic 
rights; it remedies the economic injury to the creator if he has been 
unfairly deprived of a market.91  The Lanham Act does not, however, 
protect the personal rights that moral rights preserve.92 
Commentators have also argued that U.S. copyright law protects 
moral rights.93  For example, the compulsory-license doctrine allows 
musicians to “cover” songs written by others but states that the artist 
 
 85 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) (protecting only “fine art” and defining 
the term as “an original painting, sculpture, or drawing, or an original work of art in 
glass”); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009) (stating 
that “[t]he provisions of this section shall apply only to works of fine art”); see supra 
note 83 (discussing possible reasons these statutes protect only visual art). 
 86 See Benjamin S. Hayes, Note, Integrating Moral Rights into U.S. Law and the Prob-
lem with the Works for Hire Doctrine, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1025 (2000); see also Kelly, 
supra note 11, at 230. 
 87 McCartney, supra note 25, at 40–41. 
 88 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 89 Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (providing civil action against “any person who, on or in 
connection with any goods or services . . .  uses in commerce any . . . false designa-
tion of origin . . . which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or deceive as 
to the . . . origin”). 
 90 See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 91 Roeder, supra note 30, at 568.  See also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox 
Films Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (holding that the Lanham Act only protects de-
signation of manufacturing origin and not designation of creative origin). 
 92 See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37; see supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Susan C. Anderson, Note, Decontextualization of Musical Works: Should the Doc-
trine of Moral Rights Be Extended?, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 869, 
874–75 (2006). 
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covering the song shall not “change the basic melody or fundamental 
character of the work,”94 which is arguably akin to the right of integri-
ty.  However, the compulsory-license doctrine only protects the copy-
right owner, who is often not the creator.95  Moreover, it protects only 
copyrighted works and expires with the copyright.96  Moral rights pro-
tect all artistic works and are perpetual.97 
Contract doctrine is the third U.S. legal regime claimed to pro-
tect moral rights because artists are, in theory, “free to insist on moral 
rights provisions in their contracts.”98  However, artists usually have 
very little bargaining power, particularly at the start of their careers, 
and have little knowledge of their contract rights.99  Accordingly, art-
ists often cannot afford to, or do not know to, insist on moral-rights 
provisions in their contracts.100  Not only is contract law inadequate at 
protecting moral rights, but it often undermines the very protection 
moral rights afford.  If freedom of contract is given priority over mor-
al rights, moral rights can be waived in contract.  Due to the large 
disparity in bargaining power between content providers and artists, 
content providers would likely always insist that artists opt out of 
moral-rights provisions in their contracts.101 
III. TENSIONS BETWEEN MORAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
Formal recognition of moral rights would establish legal inter-
ests that conflict with economic interests.  Because U.S. policy seeks 
to retain priority for economic rights while also complying with the 
Berne Convention (in order to provide greater international protec-
tion for its economic rights-holders), the legislature has traditionally 
 
 94 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006); Anderson, supra note 93, at 874. 
 95 Roeder, supra note 30, at 566; see supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
 96 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2). 
 97 See supra text accompanying note 38. 
 98 See Merryman, supra note 72, at 1043.  This sentiment was echoed by now-
Justice Stephen Breyer, who once wrote that statutory moral-rights protection is un-
necessary because existing copyright law “provides a protective umbrella beneath 
which author and publisher can work out, in their contract, safeguards for the author.”  
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, 
and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 290 (1970). 
 99 Merryman, supra note 72, at 1043. 
 100 Id. 
 101 This was in fact the result after the relatively recent United States Supreme 
Court decision in N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).  In this case, the 
Court gave freelance journalists something akin to a moral right when it held that al-
though publishers own the copyright to the collective work, they do not have the 
right to present the authors’ individual articles out of context.  See id. at 488, 493–97.  
However, the Court noted that this pseudo-moral right can freely be contracted away.  
See id. at 499. 
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argued that common-law causes of action sufficiently protect moral 
rights.102  This line of reasoning, however, is presumably an attempt by 
Congress to avoid statutory moral-rights protection without violating 
the Berne Convention.  Arguing that these common-law doctrines sa-
feguard moral rights proves to be an absurdity because moral rights 
are in fact at odds with the economic interests these common-law 
doctrines were created to protect.  Put another way, moral rights did 
not exist at common law, so it is nonsensical to argue they are pro-
tected by common-law causes of action. 
A. Troubling Attempts to Protect Moral Rights Through Common-Law 
Causes of Action 
While common-law causes of action may protect the artist’s eco-
nomic rights, they do not protect the artist’s personal rights.103  These 
personal rights can only be protected through moral-rights legisla-
tion.  Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos.,104 in which the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit attempted to use 
trademark law to protect the authors’ moral rights, illustrates this 
problem.  In Gilliam, the writers of a television series brought suit 
against American Broadcasting Company for airing episodes of their 
series, which had been substantially edited, without the authors’ 
permission.105  The authors argued that these edited versions misre-
presented their work to the public.106  The Second Circuit held that 
the integrity of the authors’ work, while not protected by U.S. law via 
any moral-rights legislation, ought to be protected under the Lanham 
Act:107 
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize 
moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since 
the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, 
rights of authors. Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic 
and intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for Ameri-
can copyright law, cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists 
to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work 
to the public on which the artists are financially dependent.  Thus 
courts have long granted relief for misrepresentation of an artist’s 
 
 102 See supra text accompanying note 87. 
 103 Ong, supra note 10, passim. 
 104 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 105 Id. at 17. 
 106 Id. at 19. 
 107 For a discussion of the Lanham Act’s arguable protection of moral rights, see 
supra text accompanying notes 88–92. 
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work by relying on theories outside the statutory law of copy-
right.108 
The court’s noble intent in Gilliam clearly recognized that art 
contains interests worth protecting beyond economic interests.  How-
ever, the court used inadequate means of protecting those interests.  
It attempted to transform moral rights into something very similar to 
what is already protected by copyright law.109  Legal doctrines such as 
copyright, contract, and trademark protect economic rights; to say 
that they also protect moral rights is to say that moral rights reduce to 
economic rights, which they fundamentally do not.  In essence, the 
court morphed moral rights into economic rights and, in doing so, 
rendered impotent the very non-economic interests that moral rights 
aim to protect. 
Professor Burton Ong made a similar argument in his article, 
Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Integrity 
Rights.110  Ong is not reacting to Gilliam, but rather to Henry Hans-
mann and Marina Santilli’s transposition of property law onto moral 
rights.111  However, Ong’s argument is akin to this concern with Gil-
liam-esque backdoor approaches to protecting moral rights because 
Ong likewise argues that moral rights cannot be protected via any 
economic doctrine—whether it be property law (as Hansmann and 
Santilli propose) or trademark law (as in Gilliam).112  Moral rights 
should not be subjected to economic analysis, according to Ong, be-
cause doing so shifts the focus from moral rights’ “intrinsic value as 
marks of respect for, and recognition of, the artistic contributions of 
the artist”––things that cannot be accounted for in an economic 
analysis.113  Further, an economic analysis focuses on the artist’s pe-
cuniary interest, which is not the interest protected by moral rights.114 
The implications of using a Gilliam-type attempt at safeguarding 
moral rights via laws that protect economic interests have been rea-
lized in at least one case, Choe v. Fordham University School of Law.115  In 
Choe, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
used Gilliam’s protection of the plaintiffs’ interests through the Lan-
 
 108 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25–26 (citations omitted). 
 109 Ong, supra note 10, at 307. 
 110 Id. passim. 
 111 Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83, at 101–02 (1997).  See generally Ong, supra 
note 10. 
 112 Ong, supra note 10, passim; see generally Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83 (ad-
vocating for moral rights, but characterizing them as “divided property rights”). 
 113 Id. at 298. 
 114 See, e.g., id. passim. 
 115 Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
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ham Act, rather than through recognition of moral rights, to con-
clude that there are no moral rights in U.S. law.116  This is, ironically, 
converse to the court’s intent in Gilliam,117 and such an application of 
Gilliam is further evidence of the impossibility of protecting moral 
rights via an economic analysis. 
B. The Lack of U.S. Statutory Moral-Rights Protection Results  
from Conflicts Between Moral Rights and Common-Law  
Causes of Action 
Because moral rights exist independently of economic rights, 
the two naturally conflict on occasion.  Resolving some of these con-
flicts requires choosing whether to give legal priority to either moral 
rights or copyrights—to the detriment of the other.  Congress’s re-
fusal to formally recognize moral rights is likely driven by its prefe-
rence for economic interests and thus its corresponding reluctance to 
recognize rights that may trivialize these economic interests. 
For example, moral rights may interfere with freedom of con-
tract in several ways.118  First, moral rights are not waivable,119 which 
limits parties’ freedom to negotiate moral-rights provisions into and 
out of a contract.  Second, moral rights abridge copyright licensing 
agreements by establishing that the artist retains moral rights, regard-
less of what is purportedly transferred via a license.120  Finally, moral 
rights excuse the artist from completing a commissioned work for 
personal reasons, regardless of a contractual obligation to the con-
trary.121 
The moral-rights doctrine may also interfere with current U.S. 
copyright law.122  The moral right to resale profits, for example, not 
 
 116 Id. at 49 (“There is no federal claim for violation of plaintiff’s alleged ‘moral 
rights.’ The Court in Gilliam stated that nearly 20 years ago.”). 
 117 See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 118 See Rigamonti, supra note 20, at 374 (arguing that moral rights impose “a man-
datory term on every contract containing a copyright license or an assignment of 
specific economic rights . . . that authors are always entitled to rescind unilaterally 
the contract”). 
 119 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 120 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (stating that moral rights remain 
vested in the artist even when the copyright is transferred). 
 121 See DUBOFF & KING, supra note 54, at 205.  The seminal case prompting recog-
nition of this right in France was Whistler v. Eden.  Cour de cassation [Cass. 1e civ.] 
[highest court of ordinary jurisdiction] Seine, Mar. 14, 1900, D.P. 1900, I, 497 (Fr.). 
 122 Hayes, supra note 86, at 1015 (“In order to successfully attach moral rights to 
American law it would be necessary to effectuate significant change in the funda-
mental goals and philosophy of the federal copyright law.”). 
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only conflicts with, but flies in the face of, the first sale doctrine.123  
The first sale doctrine establishes that the copyright owner’s right to a 
particular copy of her work ends once that copy has first been sold.124  
The right to resale profits, in contrast, requires a royalty be paid to 
the creator every time a copy of her work is sold—and resold.125  In 
addition, moral rights have the potential to restrict the use of a work 
in the public domain, which is problematic because works in the pub-
lic domain are, by definition, unrestricted.126  Finally, moral-rights 
theory conflicts with the work-for-hire doctrine, which is an exception 
to the general rule that the creator initially owns the copyright, 127 be-
cause moral rights do not allow “works for hire,” in the sense that the 
author cannot contract away her moral rights.128 
At least one U.S. federal circuit court has ruled that copyright 
law preempts other means of protecting artistic works.  In Laws v. So-
ny Music Entertainment,129 the plaintiff attempted to use the right of 
publicity to obtain relief from her record company, which licensed 
her song (in which the record company owned the copyright) for a 
use of which she did not approve.130  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that the Copyright Act preempts the right of 
publicity because to conclude otherwise would imply that “virtually 
every use of a copyrighted sound recording would infringe upon the 
original performer’s right of publicity.”131  This ruling reinforces the 
 
 123 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006); see Desai, supra note 47, at 18. 
 124 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully 
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without 
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord.”). 
 125 Liemer, supra note 12, at 55; see also supra text accompanying note 29. 
 126 Shostakovich v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 80 N.Y.S. 2d 575, 578 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1948). 
 127 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire” as “(1) a work prepared by an 
employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered 
or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work”). 
 128 Hayes, supra note 86, at 1027–31 (pointing out that moral rights potentially 
conflict with the work-for-hire doctrine). The author usually cannot contract away 
moral rights because they are not waivable.  Liemer, supra note 12, at 44. 
 129 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 130 Id. at 1136. 
 131 Id. at 1145.  Ironically, this is exactly the sort of implication that can be useful 
in helping to discourage illegal music-file sharing.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing the 
need for a legally protected artists’ right that is infringed when the consumer down-
loads). 
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notion that in the current U.S. legal regime an artist retains no rights 
to her work once she has transferred its copyright.132 
In addition to conflicting with U.S. contract doctrine and copy-
right law, moral rights also conflict with the free alienability of prop-
erty.  In American law, property rights often take precedent over oth-
er rights,133 and moral rights are essentially a form of servitude 
restricting the free alienability of intellectual property.134  In an article 
titled Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Econom-
ic Analysis, Hansmann and Santilli attempt to superimpose property 
law onto moral rights by arguing that in U.S. law “a seller of chattel 
generally cannot reserve rights in the chattel . . . that are enforceable 
against subsequent purchasers.”135  Moral rights, Hansmann and San-
tilli theorize, attempt to change this rule for art by allowing the au-
thor to create a negative servitude in her work, in the form of prohi-
biting deformation or mutilation without the author’s permission.136  
In this way, moral rights lower the value of artwork as property by re-
stricting the way the artwork can be used and transferred.137 
Moral rights conflict with notions such as freedom of contract, 
copyright, and free transferability of property.  Because the United 
States tends to favor protection of economic interests at (almost) all 
costs, there is a national reluctance to recognize moral rights.  How-
ever, it is unclear just why economic rights, and doctrines protecting 
them, ought to be prioritized above other rights.  Additionally, such a 
prioritization can lead to unintended consequences, some of which 
may in fact prove detrimental to the economic interest-holders. 
IV. FOR THE LOVE OF MONEY: DRIVING FORCES BEHIND ILLEGAL 
MUSIC-FILE SHARING AND MORAL RIGHTS AS AN ANTIDOTE 
One unintended consequence of prioritizing economic rights in 
artistic works has been a shift in society’s view of those works.  Society 
loses sight of the works’ non-economic value when only the economic 
 
 132 Robert Gerber, Copyright Act Preempts Singer's Right of Privacy and Publicity Claims 
Under California Law, INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW BLOG, June 29, 2006, 
http://www.intellectualpropertylawblog.com/archives/22883-print.html. 
 133 See FISHER, supra note 6, at 138; Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in 
Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 814 (2001). 
 134 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL 
ARTS 310 (4th ed. 2002); Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83, at 101–02; Julie Levy, 
Creative Works as Negotiable Instruments: A Compromise between Moral Rights Protection and 
the Need for Transferability in the United States, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 27, 29 (2003). 
 135 Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83, at 101. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See id. 
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value is protected by law, causing the works to be viewed as commodi-
ties rather than as art. 
A. Major Labels’ Treatment of Music as a Marketable Commodity 
Major labels view, treat, and market artists solely in terms of their 
profit-making ability, reflecting their view of music as a commodity.  
As Julie Levy writes, “in the United States, creative works are com-
modities that can be bought and sold.  Copyrights give authors eco-
nomic incentives to create but fail to recognize the final product as a 
reflection of the authors’ personalities.”138  For the record label, “a hit 
song is an annuity, earning money year after year for its lucky own-
er,”139 with its “lucky owner” almost always being the record company.  
In viewing music as a commodity, major labels attempt to maximize 
the profits derived from it, often at the expense of both the artist and 
music fans. 
One way major labels have maximized profits is through de-
creased payments to artists.140  Record contracts generally require art-
ists to relinquish ownership of their sound recordings to the record 
label; this is accomplished by transferring the works’ copyright.141  
Furthermore, artists realize only a very small fraction of the profits 
from their albums, with the majority going to the label.  On average, 
the record label pays an artist a meager $1.43 for the sale of each 
compact disc with a suggested retail price of nineteen dollars.142  
Another example of decreased payments to artists is several major la-
bels’ continued deduction of “breakage” expenses from artists’ royal-
ties, despite the fact that “breakage” refers to record albums made of 
shellac, which have not been used in the industry for quite some 
time.143 
As another method of reducing expenses, major labels have de-
creased the quality of the artists they sign144 and decreased time spent 
 
 138 Levy, supra note 134, at 27. 
 139 FREDRIC DANNEN, HIT MEN: POWER BROKERS AND FAST MONEY INSIDE THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 32 (1990). 
 140 See Gary Shapiro, Sell Don’t Sue, ISM SOUND NETWORK NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, 
http://www.ismsound.com/index/news/id.223. 
 141 E.g., Desai, supra note 46, at 18–19. 
 142 See TED LATHROP, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC MARKETING AND PROMOTION: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CREATING A COMPLETELY INTEGRATED MARKETING AND E-
MARKETING CAMPAIGN 81 (rev. ed. 2003). 
 143 FISHER, supra note 6, at 158. 
 144 MAT CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLE WITH MUSIC 9 (2005) (commenting that music 
was worth 51.7 cents per minute in 1992 and only fifteen cents per minute in 2002). 
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on artist development.145  Instead of treating music as the non-
commodifiable art form that it is, major labels treat music as some-
thing manufacturable.  Matt Callahan states that “a large quantity of 
music is produced according to formulas, more or less rationally de-
signed, and promoted for sale amongst the populace as a replace-
ment for that which organically arises from amongst them.”146  He 
calls this “Anti-Music” and characterizes it as “the sonic equivalent of 
fast food.”147  Major labels have flooded the marketplace with this low-
quality manufactured “music,” leaving music consumers “to more 
readily consume the McMusic which can be more effectively con-
trolled and more profitably sold than the genuine article.”148 
In addition to reducing expenses, major labels have increased 
costs to consumers.149  Average compact disc prices rose from ten dol-
lars to fifteen dollars between 1995 and 2000, despite the fact that the 
cost of producing a compact disc declined substantially during that 
period;150 prices rose another 7.2% between 1999 and 2001.151  This 
price increase was substantial enough to warrant scrutiny by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission after thirty states filed suit against the major 
labels for price fixing.152 
Major labels have also exploited consumers in their treatment of 
music as a commodity by molding music fans into “markets.”  Just as 
lowering production costs and payments to artists exploits music and 
musicians, attempting to capture as much of the consumers’ disposa-
ble income as possible exploits music fans.153  As Ryan Mills writes, 
 
 145 See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 108; Claire Matheson, Could EMI Become 
No. 1 Bid. Target?, BBC NEWS, May 22, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6446255.stm (“[I]f consolidation continues, 
companies will be firmly focused on the money and not the music––and that means 
even less artist development and a lot more ‘one-hit wonders’.”). 
 146 CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 23. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at xx. 
 149 See Shapiro, supra note 140. 
 150 Too Much for Mozart, ST. LEGISLATURES, Dec. 2000, at 10, 10; U.S. States Sue Big 
Music, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 8, 2000, http://money.cnn.com/2000/08/08/ 
companies/record_industry. 
 151 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 70. 
 152 U.S. States Sue Big Music, supra note 150.  The states asserted that the price in-
crease caused consumers to pay $480 million more than they should have between 
1997 and 2000.  Id.  The labels later settled with the FTC.  Michele Wilson-Morris, 
Five Major Labels Settle with the FTC over Retailer CD Pricing, MUSICDISH, May 11, 2000, 
http://musicdish.com/mag/?id=974. 
 153 See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 30 (“[T]he music industry has had the 
amazing luxury of earning billions of dollars every year, despite the fact that the con-
sumer has had to constantly sacrifice some essential needs and desires, simply to get 
any music at all.”). 
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“music [is] no longer about the music; it [is] about grabbing the at-
tention of the distracted listener and thus drawing a profit from them 
[sic].”154  This treatment of music audiences as markets is “the de-
struction of an organic, uncommodifiable relationship between 
people and their creative expressions, and the construction of an ex-
ploitative one in its place.”155 
Finally, major labels also attempt to maximize profits by forcing 
others out of the market.  There were only three “major labels” as of 
2008, and each had its own distributors.156  Large conglomerates also 
have a heavy hand in the radio and retail sectors of the music indus-
try.  Until recently, one such conglomerate, Clear Channel Commu-
nications, owned a majority of U.S. major radio stations and many live 
music venues.157  Additionally, in 2002–2004, “big box” stores, such as 
Wal-Mart, sold more recorded music than traditional record stores, 
and Wal-Mart was the top music retailer of 2007.158  This results in the 
manufacture, distribution, and sale of music largely by huge, profit-
driven conglomerates, rather than boutique, music-driven compa-
nies.159 
B. Major Labels’ Commodification of Music Created an Environment 
Conducive to Illegal Music-File-Sharing 
To many consumers there is a special quality of art that makes a 
fifteen-dollar pile of bricks, for example, inherently less valuable than 
a fifteen-dollar music compact disc.160  As Rajan Desai writes, “[m]usic 
 
 154 Ryan Mills, Contemporary Music (Feb. 20, 2005) (unpublished paper), availa-
ble at http://tonalatonal.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_archive.html. 
 155 CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 27. 
 156 See DANNEN, supra note 139, at 111–12 (explaining that what makes a label “ma-
jor” is that it does its own nationwide distribution). 
 157 See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Clear Channel Sale to End Era, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2006, 
at D01 (characterizing Clear Channel as “a giant that dominated the industry and 
became the bogyman of media consolidation for the past half-decade”). 
 158 Record stores accounted for 36.8%, 33.2%, and 32.5% of recorded music sales 
in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively; “other” stores accounted for 50.7%, 52.8%, and 
53.8% of recorded music sales in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively.  Recording In-
dus. Ass’n of Am., 2006 Consumer Profile, http://76.74.24.142/E795D602-FA50-
3F5A-3730-9C8A40B98C46.pdf.  In 2006, record stores accounted for 35.4% of rec-
orded music sales, and “other” stores accounted for 32.7% of recorded music sales.  
Id.  Wal-Mart was the number one music retailer of 2007.  Steve Knopper, Wal-Mart 
Demands CD-Price Cut, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 3, 2008, at 16. 
 159 See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 109.  This is exemplified in the fact that 
“[Wal-Mart] is powerful enough that it can bypass the record industry entirely, as it 
did with the Eagles’ Long Road Out of Eden, which sold 2.6 million copies exclusively 
through Wal-Mart.”  Knopper, supra note 158, at 16. 
 160 It is this “special quality” that moral rights seek to protect. 
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has a purpose and a meaning greater than economic concerns.”161  
Art is not necessarily intended to be profitable, and when a supplier 
commodifies it, it does not necessarily work the way a widget would in 
the marketplace.162  Music cannot be mass-produced in a factory.163  
Sarah Zimmerman writes that “anytime you take something that is 
precious to you [like music] and commodify it, it’ll eventually come 
back to hurt you.”164  In this case, treatment of music as a commodity 
“came back to hurt” major labels by causing consumers to likewise 
view music as a commodity. 
At some point, major labels raised their prices too high and lo-
wered their quality too far, forcing consumers to look for alternate 
channels of music distribution.  It is at this point that Napster and 
similar services entered the market and filled this consumer need.165  
As Callahan writes: “What downloading has done is to expose the in-
equities inherent in the current system of music distribution.  It has 
laid bare the way the music industry has functioned since recorded 
music became a profitable commodity.”166  This is similar to what oc-
curred in the travel industry with the birth of online travel agents, 
such as Expedia and Orbitz.  Airlines and hotels were forced to lower 
their prices and strengthen their quality standards167 in order to com-
 
 161 Desai, supra note 46, at 3. 
 162 See GEORGE W.F. HEGEL, HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 40–41 (T.M. Knox 
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1949) (1821) (arguing that works of art may not be 
“things” because “while possession of these may be the subject of business dealings 
and contracts, as if they were things, there is also something inward and mental” 
about them); Hughes, supra note 9, at 315 (highlighting differences between ideas 
and physical property). 
 163 This relates back to Callahan’s characterization of mass-produced “McMusic” 
as something distinct from genuine “music.”  CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at xx. 
 164 Sarah Zimmerman, Jaded at Ten, MAXIMUM ROCKNROLL, June 1994, available at 
http://www.arancidamoeba.com/mrr/sarahcol.html. 
 165 See David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and Intel-
lectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 
1713 (“A successful P2P project allows tens of millions of users to subvert what is per-
ceived as an unjust institution––the content industry’s control over distribution of 
creative works . . . .”). 
 166 CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 226. 
 167 Jeff Higley, Technology Talk Grips Las Vegas Show: Internet’s Impact on Industry 
Turns into Focal Point at June Conference, 217 HOTEL & MOTEL MANAGEMENT 6 (2002) 
(on file with author) (illustrating that Internet reservations have increased, and rates 
have decreased, with one hotel chain reporting Internet rates down forty percent); 
Jeremy A. Verlinda & Leonard Lane, The Effect of Internet on Pricing in the Airline 
Industry 2 (Nov. 2004) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (noting that air tra-
vel prices become more competitive “as the size of the Internet airline travel search 
population grows”); Carmina Perez, E-Travel Site Takes Off, CNNMONEY.COM, May 25, 
2001, http://money.cnn.com/2001/05/25/living/q_orbitz/index.htm (“Orbitz 
could force airlines to lower fares in the immediate future . . . .”). 
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pete with these new market entrants.  As a result, revenue from lei-
sure travel in the United States increased from $400 million in 1997 
to $15.4 billion in 2000.168  The record industry ought to use this as a 
model of successful competition with new technologies, rather than 
continuing to fight against them.  In recent years, where the travel 
industry has lowered prices and increased quality, the record industry 
has increased prices169 and decreased quality.170  It is thus no wonder 
the record industry has witnessed the opposite result of the travel in-
dustry in battling competition from online distributors—record sales 
have plummeted,171 while travel sales have skyrocketed.172 
In maximizing music profits, major labels exploited artists and 
consumers by lowering quality and raising prices, while decreasing 
payments to artists.  In blunt terms, major labels have been “stealing” 
from artists and consumers for decades,173 creating a sort of “eye for 
an eye” mentality in the minds of many music consumers.  Consum-
ers felt, and continue to feel, that music is priced too high.  This in 
turn caused consumers to become resentful toward major labels, 
which further increased demand for networks such as Napster by re-
moving some of the guilt the consumer would normally feel for theft.  
In short, “[t]o much of the American public, the recording industry 
is greedy and rapacious.  It is hard for many Americans to feel guilty 
about ‘stealing’ music by downloading free MP3s when they consider 
the recording industry to have been stealing from its artists for dec-
ades.”174 
This sentiment leads to resentment toward the industry and 
makes downloading more attractive.175  Even consumers who oppose 
illegal downloading find trouble mustering sympathy for the record 
industry.176  According to the recording artist Prince, the rise of illegal 
music-file sharing has “little [to] do with people’s intrinsic respect 
[for] art and artists, and everything [to] do with the cynical attitude 
 
 168 OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, E-COMMERCE’S 
IMPACT ON THE TRAVEL AGENCY INDUSTRY 6 (2001), available at 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs210tot.pdf. 
 169 See supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text. 
 170 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 171 See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 172 See, e.g., supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 173 “Stealing” here refers to lowering payments to the artists whose products they 
are selling and increasing prices to the consumers who are purchasing the products.  
See supra notes 140–43, 149–52 and accompanying text. 
 174 Stacey M. Lantagne, Note, The Morality of MP3s: The Failure of the Recording In-
dustry’s Plan of Attack, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 280 (2004). 
 175 KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 32; Lantagne, supra note 174, at 279. 
 176 Lantagne, supra note 174, at 281. 
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of big industry conglomerates, which have consistently pushed [for] 
more and more commercial, highly profitable products at the 
[e]xpense of authentic art and respect [for] artists.”177  Because con-
sumers do not sympathize with record labels, they feel less guilt for 
obtaining record labels’ products without paying for them. 
Moreover, sharing music files without permission is currently il-
legal as copyright infringement.  An attempt to make P2P users feel 
guilty for copyright infringement is essentially a moral appeal.  This 
appeal will fail for at least two reasons.  First, copyright is inherently 
“amoral.”178  One author postulates that copyright is, in fact, amoral 
precisely because it ignores moral rights.179  Simply put, many Ameri-
cans see copyright as a money issue and not a moral issue.180  To many 
young P2P users, illegally sharing music files is “harmless fun,”181 akin 
to sneaking into a movie or reading a magazine in a bookstore coffee 
lounge and then placing it back on the shelf.  Second, consumers by 
and large simply do not sympathize with record labels, thus making 
consumers less likely to view stealing from record labels as immoral.182  
In 2000, a poll revealed that forty to fifty-six percent of all respon-
dents felt it was not immoral to download music without paying for 
it.183  In addition, a 2003 survey indicated that three out of four teens 
feel it should be legal to share music files without paying the rights-
holder.184 
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and 
other interested parties185 compare file sharing to stealing a compact 
 
 177 CALLAHAN, supra note 144, at 214. 
 178 Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ 
Rights in France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 passim (1980) 
(copyright is amoral); see Lantagne, supra note 174, at 282–83 (stating that a moral 
appeal to stop copyright infringement will fail). 
 179 DaSilva, supra note 178, at 6. 
 180 See Lantagne, supra note 174, at 283. 
 181 KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 101. 
 182 See FISHER, supra note 6, at 124 (noting that as of 2003, sixty-seven percent of 
downloaders did not care whether the music they were downloading was copy-
righted; this percentage was higher than ever before); Lantagne, supra note 174, at 
278–83. 
 183 FISHER, supra note 6, at 3; see also Lantagne, supra note 174, at 282 (indicating 
that “most people do not think it is immoral [to download MP3s] independent of 
copyright law”). 
 184 KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 101.  Note that this does not indicate 
whether or not teens feel they ought to pay the artist. 
 185 Congressman Howard Berman, Speech to the Computer & Communications 
Industry Association Regarding Solutions to Peer to Peer Piracy (July 25, 2002), 
available at 
http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca28_berman/ComputerCommunicationsIndustry
Assosiation.shtml (“There is no difference between pocketing a CD in a Tower 
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disc, but frankly, American music consumers just do not buy it (liter-
ally).186  First, many consumers download songs that they would not 
otherwise pay for; second, there is the notion that when a compact 
disc is stolen from a store, that store has one less disc to sell—the 
same is not true with digital music files.187  Many consumers simply do 
not liken P2P music-file sharing to shoplifting.  This, along with the 
absence of sympathy for record labels, amplifies the lack of guilt con-
sumers feel for engaging in the activity, thus making illegal down-
loading more attractive and increasingly popular. 
C. Moral-Rights Protection as a Remedy 
Moral-rights protection can help undo the harmful side effects 
that have resulted from major labels’ commodification of music, in-
cluding causing consumers to lose sight of the value of music and re-
frain from feeling guilty for illegally downloading music.  Commodi-
fication of music causes both the record label and the consumer to 
lose sight of that je ne sais quoi188 in music that makes it something 
more than a disposable good.  It is this same je ne sais quoi that moral 
rights seek to protect.  As a result, enacting moral-rights legislation 
can help restore the value placed on music and help consumers de-
cide once again that it is worth paying for.  Moral rights can 
accomplish this, in part, by bolstering respect for art and artists. 
A society’s laws protecting art reflect the value (or lack thereof) 
placed on art by that society.189  Consequently, a society with laws that 
protect only art’s economic interests teaches its members that only 
the monetary value derived from art is worth protecting.  Moral rights 
can create a social respect for art because they demonstrate that so-
ciety views the non-economic value of art as important enough to 
warrant legal protection.190  This social respect for art cultivated by 
moral rights can in turn help de-commodify music, which can make 
illegally downloading it less attractive. 
 
Records and downloading copyrighted songs. . . . Theft is theft.”).  Notably, Con-
gressman Berman represents California’s Twenty-Eighth District, home to many ma-
jor labels’ West Coast headquarters. 
 186 Lantagne, supra note 174, at 278. 
 187 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 70–71 (citing Jane Black, Big Music’s Broken Record, 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ 
content/feb2003/tc20030213_9095_tc078.htm). 
 188 Translated from the French for “I do not know what” and meaning, roughly, 
“that little something; a quality that eludes description.”  NEW DICTIONARY OF 
CULTURAL LITERACY 70 (3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.bartleby.com/cgi-
bin/texis/webinator/sitesearch?query=je+ne+sais+quoi&filter=col59&Submit=Go. 
 189 See Liemer, supra note 12, at 41. 
 190 See Ong, supra note 10, at 311–12. 
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In addition to creating respect for art, moral rights can create 
social respect for artists.191  As Russell DaSilva writes: “[T]he failure of 
the federal copyright law even to address the issue [of moral rights] 
creates a national standard of indifference toward artists’ rights.”192  
Moral-rights legislation would help make the United States an envi-
ronment in which contributions of the artist are recognized.193  The 
current lack of moral-rights protection in the United States creates 
the perverse situation in which the owner of the art’s copyright is pro-
tected under the law, while the actual creator of the art is not.194  The 
current regime, therefore, not only gives preference to copyrights 
over moral rights, but also to content owners over creators.195  Garner-
ing respect for art and artists can help de-commodify music by in-
creasing the value placed on it and thus making it something con-
sumers are more ready to pay for and less likely to steal. 
Moral rights can also create more consumer guilt for illegal mu-
sic-file sharing by creating a second victim of illegal downloading—
the artist.  While consumers tend not to sympathize with major 
record labels, many downloaders would gladly pay for an album if the 
proceeds went directly to the artist.196  However, consumers “are be-
coming aware that the record companies want them to pay some-
where between six to fifteen times what the artist makes from the sale 
of the [compact disc].”197  The RIAA’s widely publicized lawsuits 
 
 191 See Holst, supra note 56, at 114. 
 192 DaSilva, supra note 178, at 6. 
 193 Ong, supra note 10, at 302. 
 194 This is assuming the creator and the copyright owner are not the same person, 
which they usually are not.  See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 195 See DaSilva, supra note 178, at 54. 
 196 See Lantagne, supra note 174, at 280. This postulation finds support in the re-
cent success of Radiohead’s album, In Rainbows, which the band initially made avail-
able only as a download and allowed downloaders to name their own price.  Paul 
Sexton, Back to the Future, BILLBOARD, Jan. 12, 2008, at 27.  While the band has not re-
leased official U.S. sales figures as of the writing of this Comment, the average price 
paid for the download is estimated at between eight and nine dollars.  Id.  Even 
sources estimating more modest prices of two or three dollars acknowledge that this 
is nonetheless more than the band would have been paid as a royalty on a regularly-
priced compact disc from its record label.  Sheila Marikar, Radiohead Lets Fans Set CD 
Price, ABC NEWS, Nov. 6, 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/ 
story?id=3826638&page=1.  Musical group Nine Inch Nails has also reaped the bene-
fits of the Radiohead model; Nine Inch Nails’ 2008 album, Ghosts I-IV, was only avail-
able for purchase from the artist’s own Web site and took in $1.6 million in sales its 
first week.  NIN Scores with Web Release, ROLLING STONE, Apr. 3, 2008, at 16. 
 197 KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 32. 
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against music downloaders198 have ironically reiterated this fact to 
consumers.199  Consumers see that it is the record labels—and not the 
artists—suing for downloading, which implies that it is the record la-
bels’ interests they are infringing, and not the artists’, when they use 
P2P networks. 
Moral-rights legislation, in contrast to copyright law, can help 
consumers frame illegal music-file sharing as stealing from the artist 
(and not merely the record label) by creating a legal right for artists 
that is infringed when music is illegally downloaded, even if the artist 
no longer owns the copyright.  What is more, moral rights can help 
consumers see that they are stealing more than money when they 
download songs without permission; each song contains a piece of 
the artist himself. 
Although adopting moral-rights protection into U.S. law would 
make it illegal to violate moral rights, it is not the fear of additional 
punishment that will discourage consumers from using P2P networks 
to share music.  Instead, moral rights will help educate consumers 
that when they do so they are diverting income from a “starving art-
ist,” which will help create sympathy that can discourage consumers 
from downloading.  Legally recognized moral rights will not help 
curb P2P music-file sharing by providing another cause of action by 
which to punish it but rather will make a statement about the value of 
art.  In this way, moral rights can help to change consumer norms re-
garding the value of music. 
V. TEACHING AN OLD DOG NEW TRICKS: CONVINCING CONTENT 
OWNERS THAT MORAL-RIGHTS PROTECTION IS NECESSARY 
The recorded music industry would likely initially oppose moral-
rights legislation because moral rights would limit the economic val-
ue of copyrights by restricting their use and alienability.200  Addition-
ally, moral rights would increase record labels’ expenses in the form 
of time spent securing permission from the creator each time the la-
bel wanted to exploit the work.  This decrease in economic value and 
 
 198 See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster, No. Civ. 04-1569-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33227 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2007); Priority Records LLC v. Chan, No. 04-CV-
73645-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20360 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2005). 
 199 The suits have also caused a tremendous loss in the consumer’s trust of the 
record labels.  KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 147.  Additionally, the suits have 
ironically provided valuable public relations for file sharing technology.  Opderbeck, 
supra note 165, at 1721. 
 200 Ironically, this desire to maximize economic potential is one of the very rea-
sons consumers do not feel guilty about stealing from record labels via file sharing.  
See supra Part IV. 
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increase in expenses would essentially result in increased transaction 
costs to the content owners, making the content owners unlikely to 
support moral-rights legislation. 
A. Benefits to Content Owners Will Outweigh Corresponding Decreases 
in the Value of Copyrights 
Historical opposition to moral-rights legislation has in fact come 
most prominently from movie studios, record labels, publishers, and 
the like201––the copyright owners.  During 1936 congressional hear-
ings, major film producers argued against the United States joining 
the Berne Convention because of its moral-rights provision.202  A rep-
resentative at those hearings from Twentieth Century-Fox Film Cor-
poration argued: 
Our chief objection, as I said, is to the moral clause.  That is of 
great concern to the motion-picture industry; we must have a 
right to change an author’s work. . . . A motion picture is in-
tended to have entertainment value for the great masses and its 
financial success depends upon its mass-psychology entertainment 
value; the wider the appeal, the greater its value.203 
Major record labels would likely endorse this argument as well be-
cause, like film studios, they are in the business of exploiting content 
to its maximum commercial potential. 
Moral-rights protection would limit the use of copyrighted ma-
terial by preventing anyone other than the creator from changing the 
art in certain ways.204  This, in turn, could prevent changes which 
would make the art more economically viable,205 thus lowering the 
value of the copyright.  Moral rights would also limit the free aliena-
 
 201 See Lee, supra note 133, at 804–05; David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin’s Paradox: 
The Political Economy of International Intellectual Property and the Paradox of Open Intellec-
tual Property Models, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 101, 103 (2007) (“The standard narra-
tive is that large corporate interests, such as . . . the entertainment industry, have 
been able to capture the lawmaking process such that the law has increasingly come 
to favor stronger intellectual property protection.”); Roeder, supra note 30, at 558; 
Holst, supra note 56, at 112 (quoting Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Me-
tamorphoses of Authorship, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 497). 
 202 Berne Convention, supra note 78,  art. 6bis.; Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Pa-
tents, 74th Cong. 1011–13 (1936) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Edwin P. Ki-
lroe, attorney for Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. and Movietonews, Inc.). 
 203 Hearings, supra note 202, at 1012. 
 204 See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (stating that the moral right of 
integrity prevents alteration of the work by anyone other than the creator); supra 
notes 133–37 and accompanying text (stating that moral rights interfere with the free 
alienability of property). 
 205 For example, remastering a recording, converting a recording into a new me-
dium, etc. 
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bility of artistic works by placing servitudes on them.206  Content own-
ers are likely to argue that if creative works cannot be transferred 
freely, they are of little value in the United States.207 
Several problems inherently exist in this argument.  First, to say 
artistic works are of “little value” if they cannot be traded freely is to 
say they are of “less economic value”; this argument is flawed in that it 
views art as only having value in economic terms.  Second, the file 
sharing problem is essentially music being traded too freely, so re-
straints on this literally “free” trade of music may not be harmful to-
ward copyright owners after all.  In fact, the entertainment “industry 
tends to favor strong intellectual property rules, even if such rules be-
come a sort of trade barrier.”208  In this sense, moral rights are a ne-
cessary barrier against illegal trade via P2P networks. 
Furthermore, this argument is fatally shortsighted.  The record 
industry is notorious for fighting new technologies, losing the battle, 
and then blaming the new technologies for losses in sales.209  Arguing 
against moral rights because of increased transaction costs would es-
sentially become another instance of resisting new technology.  These 
shortsighted approaches have not worked well for the record industry 
in the past, and it is highly unlikely such an approach is going to work 
in staving off illegal P2P music-file sharing.  Rather than resisting new 
technologies, the record industry must learn to exploit them.210  One 
crucial step in this lesson is realizing that the value of moral rights as 
vehicles for shifting consumer norms away from illegal music-file 
sharing outweigh the increased transaction costs due to moral rights. 
While it is true that moral-rights protection would decrease the 
economic value of copyrights, it would also help decrease illegal file 
sharing.  Over the long run, the increased transaction costs created 
by moral rights would likely be less than labels’ losses due to file shar-
ing.  File sharing, although only popularly used to share music since 
1999, has resulted in crippling losses to the music industry.211  Major 
 
 206 See supra notes 133–37 and accompanying text. 
 207 See generally Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 83 (focusing on the effects moral 
rights may or may not have on a work of art’s economic value). 
 208 Opderbeck, supra note 201, at 133. 
 209 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 69. 
 210 See id. at 73. 
 211 See Norbert J. Michel, The Impact of Digital File Sharing on the Music Industry: An 
Empirical Analysis, 6 TOPICS IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 11 (2006) (“Our micro-level 
data test results suggest that file sharing may have reduced album sales (between 
1999 and 2003) by as much as thirteen percent for some music consumers.”); INT’L 
FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 2006 PIRACY REPORT: 
PROTECTING CREATIVITY IN MUSIC 4 (2006), http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/ 
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labels are now forced to compete with P2P networks that distribute 
their product for free.  Landes and Posner postulate that “[s]triking 
the correct balance between access and incentives is the central prob-
lem in copyright law.”212  P2P networks increase consumer access ex-
ponentially—to such an extent that incentives to create are threat-
ened because record labels and artists receive no payment for their 
product when it is obtained via an illegal P2P network.  In order to 
achieve Posner’s balance, access to music must be limited to preserve 
incentives to create it.  Moral rights can help limit access by discou-
raging consumers from sharing music files illegally.  Accordingly, ma-
jor labels’ interest in decreasing illegal music-file sharing should out-
weigh their interest in preventing restrictions on the free alienability 
of copyrights.  Freely alienable copyrights will be of no use to major 
labels if those copyrights become worthless due to an epidemic of il-
legal file sharing.213 
B. Here We Are Now, Entertain Us: Innovations in Technology 
Require New Safeguards for Artistic Works 
Digital distribution is a “unique test of the copyright system.”214  
While the record industry has faced piracy since its inception, “pira-
cy” no longer means a few copies of a dubbed cassette tape.215  Works 
can now be copied with digital code and then distributed to the pub-
lic on a widespread scale in new digital formats.216  M-PEG Audio 
 
piracy-report2006.pdf (estimating that almost twenty-billion songs were illegally 
downloaded worldwide in 2005). 
 212 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989). 
 213 See KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 32 (urging that the music industry must 
put the needs of artists and consumers before “existing incumbents’ business inter-
ests” if it is to survive). 
 214 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 38, at 1994; Note, Visual Artists’ Rights in a Dig-
ital Age, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1978 (1994). 
 215 See FISHER, supra note 6, at 110; Darcie-Nicole Wicknick, The RIAA Music Down-
loading Controversy: Both Sides of the Record, MUSICBIZADVICE.COM, Oct. 17, 2007, 
http://www.musicbizadvice.com/a_little_history_on_music_piracy%20.htm. 
Before the invention of blank tape it was close to impossible to COPY a 
record. . . . Even after the invention of blank tape . . . copying a record 
was a clunky process at best, involving a reel-to-reel machine . . . . 
[When the cassette tape was invented], people began dubbing vinyl-to-
cassette and cassette-to-cassette, but chances were low that they were 
selling them . . . . Dubbing was mostly kids at home who made mix 
tapes . . . . 
Id. 
 216 Wicknick, supra note 215. 
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Layer 3 (MP3), one such format, was invented in 1996,217 and by 1999, 
“MP3” had become the most searched-for term on the Internet.218  
Additionally, the advent of P2P music-file sharing “drove demand for 
access to the Internet more powerfully than any other application.”219  
Some scholars believe that the U.S. copyright system, as originally 
conceived, simply cannot handle digital technologies.220  This necessi-
tates looking outside the copyright system for new forms of protect-
ing artistic works—moral rights are one such “new form.”221 
The law cannot keep up with increasing technology via copyright 
infringement lawsuits.222  The RIAA’s attempt to stop illegal file shar-
ing via these sorts of lawsuits has failed miserably.223  In fact, sales of 
recorded music continue to decline, despite the passing of nearly a 
decade since the RIAA won its legendary court battle to disarm Nap-
ster.224  Sales of compact discs decreased nineteen percent in 2007, 
and digital sales leveled off that year.225  In addition, 2007 saw the 
 
 217 Mary Bellis, The History of MP3, ABOUT.COM:INVENTORS, 
http://inventors.about.com/od/mstartinventions/a/MPThree.htm (“invented” re-
ferring to date U.S. patent issued for MP3 format). 
 218 MENN, supra note 1, at 110. 
 219 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 296. 
 220 Visual Artists’ Rights, supra note 214. 
 221 In addition to combating illegal digital distribution, the industry must also 
learn to use digital distribution to its advantage, as iTunes and Amazon.com have re-
cently begun to do by launching their respective online MP3 storefronts. 
 222 See FISHER, supra note 6, at 4 (commenting that record companies have been 
less successful at fighting off recent technologies than they were in shutting down 
Napster); KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 147. 
 223 For example, Capitol Records sued an alleged music downloader for copyright 
infringement; the court rejected Capitol Records’ Motion for Reconsideration after 
the lower court found the record label’s copyright infringement claims “untested 
and marginal.”  Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster, No. Civ. 04-1569-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 33227, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 23, 2007).  In another such failed suit, Priority 
Records voluntarily dismissed its suit against an alleged music downloader because of 
issues regarding which member of the household was responsible for the download-
ing.  Priority Records LLC v. Chan, No. 04-CV-73645-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20360, at *3, *7 (E.D. Mich. May 19, 2005).  Circuit courts have refused to enforce 
RIAA subpoenas requiring Internet service providers to reveal the names of custom-
ers the RIAA believes to be copyright infringers.  Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. 
Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2004); Recording Indus. Ass’n of 
Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 359 U.S. App. D.C. 85 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Contra 
Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Thomas, No. 0:2006cv01497 (D. Minn. filed Apr. 19, 
2006) (awarding jury verdict in favor of RIAA for $220,000).  See FISHER, supra note 6, 
at 3 (considering the possibility that consumers know downloading music is illegal 
and continue to engage in it anyhow).  See generally Lantagne, supra note 174. 
 224 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 225 Steve Knopper, Major Labels Drop the Ax, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 27, 2007, at 15. 
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worst sales week in Nielsen SoundScan history.226  Technology is ever-
advancing, which means that the United States legislature and the 
content owners cannot afford to be sparing with rights for artistic 
works.227  Each time the courts enjoin one generation of file-sharing 
systems, a new generation crops up, avoiding the legal issue that re-
sulted in the injunction of the previous system.228 
Any attempt by the music industry to limit illegal file sharing 
must take into account the fact that the Internet has morphed Amer-
ican values.229  The generation currently coming of age has grown up 
thinking that everything on the Internet is free, and “the music in-
dustry must convince this generation that music is not one of the In-
ternet’s ‘free goodies.’”230  There are now teenagers entering adult-
hood who have never purchased a single compact disc and obtain all 
of their music for “free” via illegal file sharing.231  In a 2007 consumer 
survey that asked young people about the last compact disc they pur-
chased, popular answers included variations of: “I don’t remember . . 
. I burn my music for free.”232  This is especially problematic because 
 
 226 The Worst Week Ever, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 27, 2007, at 82 (indicating that the 
week of Sept. 7, 2007 was the worst in Nielsen SoundScan history). 
 227 See Liemer, supra note 12, at 56–57; McCartney, supra note 25, at 72. 
 228 For example, Scour and Aimster arose after Napster.  FISHER, supra note 6, at 
112. When content holders were victorious against them in court, Gnutella arose.  Id. 
at 120.  Next came Limewire and Bearshare.  Id. at 121.  KaZaA and Morpheus de-
veloped after these.  Id.; see also Opderbeck, supra note 165, at 1689–90 (“As the 
RIAA’s tactics have changed, P2P technology has kept pace.”). 
 229 See Lantagne, supra note 174, at 290. 
 230 Id. at 291.  This is further complicated by the fact that some content on the In-
ternet is legally available for free (YouTube, Pandora Radio, etc.).  This inconsistency 
not only confuses consumers but weakens the argument that content available online 
is worth paying for. 
 231 See Scott Brown, Digital Rights Management—Go, No Go, or Just Behind the Cur-
tain?,  VIDEO INSIDER , June 4, 2007, http://www.mediapost.com/publications/ 
?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=61417 (“Today we have at least two generations that 
have used PCs and widely available ripping software to copy and in some cases distri-
bute music entertainment. . . . [T]here are teens and young adults out there who 
have never purchased a CD . . . .”); Shane Cartmill, RIAA Ruins Lives of 531 More Mu-
sic Fans, MUSIC FOR LIFE, Feb. 17, 2004, http://homepage.mac.com/scartmill/iblog/ 
C1469494906/E657060254/index.html (“There is a generation of people out there 
who have never purchased a CD in their lives.  They are not going to buy worthless 
music at inflated prices.”). 
 232 Posting of they to Survey Central, What Was the Last CD You Bought?, 
http://surveycentral.org/survey/26051.html (Jan. 8, 2007 08:06 EST).  Other an-
swers included “[i]t’s been soooo [sic] long,” “I don’t think I have ever purchased a 
CD,” “I have downloaded some,” “I stopped buying CDs because they rip you off with 
prices when I can download them for free online,” “Too long ago,” “What’s a CD??,” 
“I rarely purchase cds [sic],” “I prefer to burn my own, rather than spend 16-20 dol-
lars for something that I’m only going to listen to maybe once or twice,” “I don’t 
purchase CDs,” and “It’s been so long, I don’t remember.”  Id. 
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the generation that has grown up with the Internet is the same age 
demographic that has traditionally driven the record business.233 
In order to combat illegal music-file-sharing, it is necessary to 
counteract this shift in values by changing consumer norms, particu-
larly among the generation coming of age after the advent of the In-
ternet.  In order to urge consumers that they steal from artists when 
they use P2P networks to obtain music illegally, legally recognized art-
ists’ rights must exist that are infringed when consumers illegally 
download.  Moral rights can provide this legally protected right for 
the artist. 
VI. DYLAN’S GONE ELECTRIC: CONCLUSION, BUY IN OR CASH OUT 
Who’s going to throw that minstrel boy a coin?  Who’s going to let it roll?  
Who’s going to throw that minstrel boy a coin?  Who’s going to let it save 
his soul? 
                                    —Bob Dylan, “Minstrel Boy” 
The music industry will need to adapt if it is to survive into the 
Digital Age.  This adaptation must involve some sacrifice, including 
willingness to limit the free alienability of copyrights and to lobby for 
moral-rights legislation.  Moral rights will help to change the way 
young people view music.  Rather than depicting music as a disposa-
ble commodity, introducing moral rights will help young people to 
realize the artistic and cultural value of music and to understand that 
when they use P2P software for music-file sharing, they are not only 
stealing from the record label but also from the artist. 
Record labels are susceptible to losing artists, in addition to con-
sumers, to digital distribution.  Just as the Internet makes it easier for 
consumers to obtain music without the record label, it makes it easier 
for artists to distribute and market their music without the record la-
bel.234  To prevent this, record labels must repair their relationships 
with artists and consumers.  For decades, record labels have caused a 
disparity between themselves and artists by exploiting artists to max-
imize profits.  Consumers have sided with artists, and in order to help 
win consumers back, record labels must bridge this gap by showing 
their support of artists; rallying for moral-rights legislation is one way 
of doing so. 
 
 233 KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 7, at 100. 
 234 For example, well known artists such as the Smashing Pumpkins, the Eagles, 
and the Black Crowes have begun releasing albums on their own, without working 
with a record label.  Evan Serpick, NIN, Eagles, Pumpkins: Who Needs Labels?, ROLLING 
STONE, Apr. 17, 2008, at 11 (further noting that “thanks to digital distribution . . . the 
labels are less necessary than ever”). 
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This Comment does not intend to suggest that using P2P net-
works to download music illegally would disappear overnight upon 
the enactment of moral-rights legislation.  Instead, it urges that the 
copyright system alone is not enough to eliminate this practice.  It is 
also necessary to change the way in which music is viewed and to in-
crease the value that is placed on it by American society.  The United 
States has traditionally chosen to favor economic interests; this has 
resulted in stronger copyright protection, at the expense of moral-
rights protection.  A societal shift in the view of music, from an art 
form to a disposable commodity, has been an unintended conse-
quence of favoring economic interests.  This view of music as a com-
modity, coupled with advancing technology allowing new channels of 
music distribution, has called into question the way the music indus-
try has traditionally functioned.  Enacting moral-rights legislation 
would emphasize that music is more than just a marketable commod-
ity and that the musician, and not just the record label, has a person-
al stake in each song he creates.  This sort of message would over 
time help to create a social environment that has a greater respect for 
music and is thus more willing to pay for it and less likely to steal it. 
Finally, it should be noted that moral-rights legislation (and 
more broadly increased social respect for art and artists) is just one 
piece in the puzzle that is the survival of the record industry into the 
Internet Age.  Moral-rights legislation can help decrease illegal digital 
distribution of music, but record labels must also learn to create legal 
digital music distribution networks.  It is imperative that record labels 
take other steps as well, such as lowering prices and offering consum-
ers the increased convenience they get from digital (versus physical) 
distribution.  Such steps, when coupled with moral-rights legislation, 
will help to link the shift in consumer norms effectuated by moral 
rights with an actual shift in consumer economic behavior, in the 
form of decreased illegal music-file-sharing.  P2P file sharing allows 
consumers to obtain the same content in a more convenient and less 
expensive venue than the compact disc format offered by major la-
bels.235  Major labels must learn to use digital distribution to their ad-
vantage, thus matching the convenience offered by P2P; in essence, 
major labels must “find a way to protect artists while enabling this 
[file] sharing to survive.”236  When major labels match the conveni-
 
 235 It should be noted that some record labels have begun offering content online, 
via legal venues such as Apple’s iTunes Store; however, compact discs remain the 
mainstay.  See, e.g., Ethan Smith & Nick Wingfield, More Artists Steer Clear of iTunes, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2008, at B1. 
 236 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 66. 
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ence offered by P2P networks, all that is left is the price point, and 
moral rights, in illuminating the artist’s personality interest, can fulfill 
this last piece of the puzzle by helping consumers rediscover the val-
ue in music. 
 
